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‘Left behind’ in Bella Vista 
Zone 3
Katriena Sym considers herself lucky. She has a roof over her head, a husband who has found work on a 
farm near by, and a lodger who contributes to 
the household expenses. ‘Ceres is baie hard, en 
ek praat nou van hard’ she says, pronouncing 
her consonants with flinty Karoo precision, 
‘maar ek dink ons sal darem regkom’.1 She 
surveys the inside of her house. There is a 
plastic milk-crate which does duty as a chair; 
there is a primus stove and a few pots; there are 
two sour and ragged foam mattresses; and there 
is a ramshackle cupboard containing half a kilo 
of flour, some salt, sugar and cooking oil, and 
one tin of cheap mackerel. Beyond that, there 
is literally not a stick of furniture. The little 
space is bare and empty, cold in winter and hot 
in summer: most days Katriena prefers to sit 
outside in the shade or (in winter) at a fire built 
from scavenged wood or even discarded plastic 
soft drink bottles.
She has plenty of time to sit around these 
days. Her eyes have deteriorated much in 
recent years (‘my gesientes is nou nie wat dit 
was nie’)2 and she is medically unfit for the 
hard and exacting work of picking fruit and 
pruning trees she has done for most of her 39 
years. She originally hails from Williston in 
the Karoo, but she has spent a significant part 
of her adult life away from home, travelling 
with teams of seasonal workers to Ceres, 
Citrusdal and other towns in the Western 
Cape’s horticultural districts. It was a hard 
and expensive life, being an uitwerker, 
and she has decided to settle in Ceres. So 
far, she thinks it was a good decision. Her 
common-law husband, Isak, has found work 
at a neighbouring farm, and they now have a 
lodger who has also promised to contribute to 
household expenses.
But in spite of having made this move, her 
conditions still seem grim. Indeed, there is an 
unsettling vagueness about Katriena’s hopes 
that things will improve. The reality is that her 
husband’s job has not brought in much money. 
In theory he should be paid between R150 and 
1. Introduction
R200 per week, but she sees almost none of it. 
Lack of cash means that they have to ‘borrow’ 
food supplied by the farm shop operated by 
Isak’s employer. The supermarket in town is 
significantly cheaper – but the supermarket 
does not extend credit. Every week, Isak’s 
payslip shows that most of the money he has 
earned has already been ‘eaten up’. In a good 
week, he will bring home R50; sometimes he 
brings home nothing at all. When he does bring 
money home, Katriena spends a significant 
part of it on their accumulated water debt, 
but she does not know how much she owes. 
In practice, she often has to rely for food on 
contributions from Isak’s mother, or from ‘die 
kind se pa se ma’3 – the mother of another man 
by whom she has had her five year-old child. 
They will often lend her a cup of flour or a bit 
of meat; if all else fails, at least the child is 
able to sit down with his grandmother at table. 
Katriena goes hungry.
One woman: one household. The details of 
Katriena’s life and circumstances are specific 
to her. Each household in Vyeboomstreet 
and in all the other bleached, bare roads of 
Bella Vista Zone 3 will have a different story 
to tell. But the themes and the relationships 
will be similar. For Katriena and others like 
her, living and working in the fertile valleys 
of the Western Cape has not brought respite 
from poverty. Survival is possible, and people 
are resourceful, but hunger, debt, insecurity 
and dependence have characterised their lives 
for as long as they have known, and unless 
the underlying conditions that perpetuate this 
poverty disappear, it is unlikely that this will 
change.
And there is very little they can do about 
it. Katriena and her neighbours survive at the 
margins of rural Western Cape society. It is an 
odd kind of marginality: without her and other 
men and women like her who carry tons of Bon 
Chretien pears and Granny Smith apples out of 
the orchards every summer – sometimes at less 
than R30 (about US$5 at 2004 exchange rates) 
per day – there would be no fruit industry. But 
this economic centrality is accompanied by 
social and political invisibility. From the point 
of view of those who hold power in Ceres, 
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Katriena hardly exists – except as a potential 
source of labour. Politically, the poor in Ceres 
are not a force to be reckoned with. Instead, 
they are recipients of concern, objects of 
development, members of what is patronisingly 
referred to as the agtergeblewene gemeenskap.4 
Economically and socially, survival depends 
on the largesse of those who are wealthier and 
more powerful. Perhaps it is this brutal fact 
that is behind Katriena’s striking gentleness 
of manner – the way in which, from some 
perspectives, she hardly seems to walk the 
earth. Her very existence is a tentative one, 
dependent on a tiny net of fragile relationships. 
It is a position in which it is possible to dream, 
hope and plan. But the plans are small.
Chronic poverty on a farmed 
landscape
This paper presents key findings from 
a livelihoods survey of households in four 
poor neighbourhoods in the Western Cape 
district of Ceres, one of the centres of South 
Africa’s deciduous fruit export industry (see 
Figure 1). It explores the nature and dynamics 
of the persistence of poverty in the context of 
continued and relatively sustained economic 
development and growth, and considers 
whether the concept of ‘social exclusion’ can 
help in making sense – especially policy sense 
– of these dynamics. 
As will be seen, the conclusions are mixed. 
Focusing on ‘social exclusion’ – correctly 
understood – certainly helps draw attention 
to power relations, powerlessness, and the 
processes that perpetuate these. Coming up 
with workable policy responses to social 
exclusion requires us, however, to develop 
a much more nuanced analysis of the social 
processes involved in what is perhaps more 
productively thought of not as exclusion but as 
‘adverse incorporation’. 
The paper begins with a short description of 
Ceres as a centre of Western Cape horticulture 
and a brief introduction to the key theoretical 
issues at stake. It provides a schematic 
overview of social relations and inequality 
in Western Cape agriculture, summarises 
some of the key policy responses developed 
to address poverty and inequality after the 
transition to democratic rule in 1994, and 
sketches some of the most important trends 
in the sector. This provides the background 
for a discussion of key aspects of livelihood 
activities and problems among households in 
the neighbourhoods surveyed. 
This discussion draws not only on 
quantitative surveys and semi-structured 
interviews with selected households in the 
survey sample, but also on analyses and 
insights that flow out of medium and long-
term qualitative research and fieldwork on 
various aspects of deciduous fruit production 
and social power relations in the area. This sets 
the scene for a more detailed consideration of 
some of the underlying theoretical issues at 
stake, and a short discussion of some of some 
important policy issues.
Figure 1: Location maps of Ceres
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Ceres: poverty in a fertile valley
The town of Ceres, situated some 160km north-east of Cape Town, may look like an unlikely site for the study of the 
dynamics of long-term poverty. To the visitor 
cresting the top of Mitchell’s Pass, it looks just 
as it is described by advertising copywriters 
on the boxes of Ceres Fruit Juice that is the 
town’s most prominent branded export: a 
fertile valley nestling among the mountains, 
protected from the south-east wind and 
drenched by the sun. Throughout the summer, a 
long procession of diesel trucks labour up and 
down that pass, plying the route between the 
surrounding valleys and Cape Town harbour. 
The mountainside is rugged, bare and stony but 
for most of the year the dams are full and the 
valley floors of the Warm- and Kouebokkeveld 
mountains bear the evidence of the orderly 
activities of industrialised agriculture: onion 
and wheat fields, stud and sheep farms – and, 
above all, neat and serried ranks of closely 
planted orchards: apples, pears, nectarines, 
peaches and plums. With the general dealers, 
furniture stores, filling stations, bed and 
breakfast establishments and fast-food chains 
lined up along its main road, Ceres and the 
nearby villages of Prince Alfred’s Hamlet and 
Op die Berg present a landscape typical of any 
one of a number of small to medium-sized 
Western Cape country towns. Certainly, when 
compared to impoverished areas – the eroded 
and densely populated hillsides of the Eastern 
Cape, or the arid plains of Namaqualand to the 
north, for example – Ceres and its surrounding 
valleys seem part of a landscape where 
abundant natural resources and successful 
commercial activity would at least have the 
chance of ensuring decent livelihoods for those 
who work and live there. 
It has not always been so. The history 
of Ceres has in many ways been a story of 
roads, routes and remoteness since long 
before deciduous fruit became a major 
industry. Settled in the 18th century, it was 
a relative backwater until South Africa’s 
mineral revolution in 1870s, when its location 
on the ‘great road’ to the north-east that 
connected the Cape with the diamond mines 
of Kimberley brought it some prominence 
as a way station (Smuts & Alberts 1988). 
Diamonds were eventually eclipsed by gold, 
and the N1 and N7 highways have overtaken 
the path through the Karoopoort as the routes 
to the north, but increasing integration into 
national networks and markets opened the path 
for the development of fruit farming in the 
region. While the wine farming areas in the 
surrounding Breede River region stagnated, 
mostly due to anti-apartheid sanctions, Ceres 
steadily grew. Mixed farming (fruit, wheat, 
vegetables and livestock) increasingly gave 
way to specialisation and, by the 1990s, Ceres 
was a major centre of intensive deciduous fruit 
production for export. The high valleys of the 
Kouebokkeveld mountains were given over 
mostly to apple production, with stone fruit 
and pears predominating in the lower-lying 
Warmbokkeveld. By 1998, with more than 
11 000 ha of land planted to deciduous fruit, 
Ceres was producing almost 60% of South 
Africa’s entire pear crop, and had a gross 
geographic product of R265 million. But 
most of the 20 000 or so people who worked 
on these farms did not see any of this wealth. 
Fully half of the households in Ceres surveyed 
in the 1996 Census earned less than R18 000 
per annum (US$3 000), and in a third of rural 
enumerator areas, incomes were below R1 000 
(US$166) per month. For those who worked 
in the orchards, the realities of life were those 
experienced by Katriena Sym in the example 
above: a life on the edges of survival.
Social exclusion and inequality 
in South Africa
From its initial use in French discussions on 
social policies in the 1970s, the concept of 
‘social exclusion’ has become increasingly 
dominant in European and UK debates about 
poverty. It is reported to have increasingly 
replaced ‘poverty’ as an object of EU policy 
concern (Evans 1998), and has become very 
closely linked to the institutionalisation of 
official anti-poverty initiatives, such as in the 
creation in 1997 of an interdepartmental Social 
2. Livelihoods at the margin
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Exclusion Unit by the British government 
(Percy-Smith 2000). 
In spite of the fact that the concept 
originated in the context of wealthy European 
welfare states in the 1970s and its history 
of very close links to specifically EU policy 
concerns (Evans 1998; Percy-Smith 2000) the 
concept has broadened considerably in scope 
and meaning, and since the late 1990s there 
has been interest in seeing whether it can be 
used to understand poverty and chronic poverty 
in ‘Southern’ contexts (De Haan & Maxwell 
1998). One of the key problems here is the 
vagueness of the concept itself, because for all 
its prominence its theoretical content is rarely 
tightly and rigidly specified. This may be part 
of its appeal – as Evans suggests, perhaps 
the concept has become so attractive partly 
because of this vagueness (Evans 1998:46). 
Certainly, it has been used by researchers and 
policymakers from very diverse theoretical 
backgrounds, and has been given very 
divergent meanings within different political 
and intellectual circles (Silver 1994). 
Even so, the attempt to use the concept 
outside its original scope of application 
does raise – even in principle – some initial 
difficulties. For one thing, there are very 
important differences between European 
societies and those in the South, not least 
because poverty in contexts like sub-Saharan 
Africa may be viewed as the situation of 
the mass of the population rather than a fate 
suffered by a minority excluded from the 
benefits of participation of society at large 
(Gore 1994). Gore has nonetheless argued that 
a complex politics of exclusion and inclusion 
has formed an important part of the histories 
of African societies and has accordingly 
included these dynamics in his survey of social 
exclusion in Africa. 
The question, however, is whether ‘social 
exclusion’ can be linked to the roots of chronic 
poverty in Africa – in other words, whether it 
has application beyond the limits of a concern 
with the exclusion of or discrimination against 
particular ‘subordinate groups’, and whether 
it has anything to teach us about poverty as 
such. Some theorists certainly seem to believe 
so: they have been attracted to the concept 
because it has seemed to be available for 
interpretations that link it closely with other 
increasingly dominant paradigms such as the 
sustainable livelihoods framework (DFID 
2000) and Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities 
and entitlements. What these approaches have 
in common is an interest in broadening the 
understanding of poverty beyond a narrow 
monetary focus on income and expenditure. 
Understood in this way, analyses of ‘social 
exclusion’ can potentially highlight the multi-
dimensional nature of the implications of 
poverty, and highlight the longer-term social 
and institutional processes that shape it (De 
Haan 1998). Taking their cue from De Haan, 
Hulme, Moore and Shepherd have therefore 
proposed that the concept may be useful in the 
general study of chronic poverty:
as de Haan (1999) discusses, the 
concept has been... usefully extended 
to encompass the multi-dimensional, 
relational aspects of deprivation and 
poverty–- i.e. people are excluded not 
only from publicly provided services but 
from a broad range of social, political 
and economic institutions, and as 
a result experience lack of capabilities 
and entitlements. Social exclusion may 
therefore be a useful starting point 
from which to understand the politics 
surrounding chronic poverty, perhaps 
especially where chronic poverty 
is based on the discrimination of a 
particular social group or ‘underclass’. 
(Hulme et al. 2001:27)
There is certainly food for thought in this 
broad definition of what ‘social exclusion’ 
is about. Consider, for instance, the idea 
that the existence and possible growth of 
such an underclass – a significant group of 
marginalised, relatively unskilled and poorly 
paid workers making an uncertain living out of 
seasonal labour in the agricultural economy – is 
far from unique to the deciduous fruit farming 
sector. Recent scholarship (May 2000; Nattrass 
& Seekings 2001) suggests that poverty in 
South Africa is particularly concentrated in 
two large groups – the marginal working class 
and an ‘other’ class made of the dispossessed 
jobless – that are unable to participate fully 
in the formal economy. While the wealthiest 
12% of households control 45% of the total 
household income in South Africa, these two 
impoverished groups, which together comprise 
some 41% of South African society, only 
manage to secure 10% of its total income (see 
Table 1). Furthermore, while South Africa is 
similar to the most unequal societies in the 
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world in its income distribution, there is one 
important difference: unlike countries like 
Brazil and Chile, the poor in South Africa are 
not involved in subsistence agriculture. This 
means that the poorest of the poor are worse 
off in terms of their share of total income 
than in Latin American countries (Nattrass & 
Seekings 2001:476). 
The existence of these large, marginalised 
and impoverished groupings in South African 
society – and the profound division between 
them and the much wealthier groupings of 
urban and formally employed ‘insiders’ 
– raises important and complex policy issues. 
Nattrass and Seekings argue that while fiscal 
policy in South Africa has been relatively 
redistributive, its effects may have been 
undermined by the adoption of a growth path 
that militates against the creation of jobs in the 
labour-intensive sectors of the economy. South 
African industry has, they argue, been caught 
between simultaneous processes of industry 
deregulation and increasingly high levels of 
labour market re-regulation. Globalisation has 
increased opportunities in some quarters, but it 
has also led to increasing competition – while 
at the same time labour market regulation has 
become more rigid. Rather than allow for more 
flexibility, minimum wage levels in many 
industries are set by centralised bargaining 
councils. In the context of an economy where 
the demand curve for labour is relatively price-
sensitive, they argue that this has created an 
incentive for industries to move away from 
labour absorptive strategies towards capital 
intensity. These policies benefit an increasingly 
small and beleaguered core working class at 
the same time as they deepen the divisions that 
exclude those thrown out onto the margins 
by employers’ changing strategies in the job 
market. 
By emphasising the conflict of interests 
between the interests of, on the one hand, the 
core working class and the semi-professional 
classes and, on the other, those at the margins 
of the economy, Nattrass and Seekings also 
claim to explain why democracy has not led 
to a more egalitarian distribution of income in 
South African society. The governing African 
National Congress (ANC) has its power base 
in the urban areas. It is particularly sensitive 
to the concerns, not of the vast underclass of 
politically demobilised and marginal rural 
poor and the landless unemployed, but to the 
needs of the urbanised working class and petty 
civil servants. These have a disproportionately 
strong voice in the shaping of government 
policy. Ironically, then, democracy has 
politically empowered not the poorest of 
the poor, but the almost-poor, the all-but-
poor, and the not-so-poor. The marginalised 
working class and landless unemployed, they 
suggest, are poor not only because of their 
relative exclusion from the formal economy, 
but also by virtue of their political marginality 
within the South African democratic system. 
The answer to a more egalitarian income 
distribution lies, they argue, not in the 
further entrenchment of labour rights and the 
protection of workers, but in the adoption of 
policies that will encourage the creation of jobs 
from which the economically excluded can 
benefit. 
Nattrass and Seekings do not quite go so 
far as to argue that low wages are good for the 
poor. Low-waged new jobs, Nattrass points 




Households in each class 
as a % of all households
Income in each class as a % 
of total income
Upper class 7 020 12 45
Semi-professional class 3 264 5
}43
8
}41Intermediate class 2 257 19 22
Core working class 1 187 19 11
Petty traders 1 442 5 4




Other 413 29 6
Total 100 100
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out elsewhere (Nattrass 1996), may well 
drag down the incomes of those who already 
have jobs. However, their argument certainly 
raises important questions about the policies 
that are necessary to address the needs of the 
long-term poor. If the interests and needs of 
the marginal working class and those of the 
landless unemployed are indeed distinctive, 
what policies and interventions are required in 
order to address those needs? If the situation of 
the poorest sections of South African society 
is defined by their marginality within this 
society, their inability to participate fully in 
the labour market and society as a whole, what 
can be done to address this situation? If ‘social 
exclusion’ is indeed the best way of thinking 
about this problem, does that mean ‘inclusion’ 
is the cure? And how is such ‘inclusion’ to be 
effected? 
Answering these questions will, inter alia, 
require a look at the conceptual logic of the 
notion of social exclusion itself. It will be 
necessary to make explicit some of its core 
assumptions and meanings, and the broader 
political and policy narratives of which it forms 
a part. This paper will, however, not remain 
strictly at the abstract level. Rather, it will 
also explore some of the empirical complexity 
of chronic poverty in Ceres and consider the 
implications for the concept of social exclusion 
as a way of making policy sense out of these 
facts. 
Understanding livelihoods at the 
margin
The analysis of the dynamics of poverty 
is increasingly being dominated by the 
concepts of ‘livelihoods analysis’. Murray has 
commended this framework for its focus on 
understanding the changing combinations of 
modes of livelihood in a dynamic and historical 
context, its advocacy of multi-level and 
multi-sectoral analysis and its focus on intra 
and extra-household social relations (Murray 
2001). 
However, he has also observed that the 
model should be supplemented by an adequate 
understanding of the broader processes within 
which particular household livelihood profiles 
and choices have their existence. This includes 
the need to properly understand intra and inter-
household conflicts and struggles, as well as 
inequalities of power and conflicts and interest 
between communities of poor and others, such 
as local elites or government agencies (Murray 
2001). 
Two caveats are accordingly particularly 
important. In the first place, it is important 
to guard against any assumption that the 
measurement of poverty or the assessment of 
livelihoods can somehow proceed through a 
sort of simple cumulative enumeration of assets 
in the ‘asset pentagon’ of the DFID livelihoods 
model (DFID 2000). As Murray remarks, 
even ‘economic’ capital is best conceived 
of as a social relation between people. The 
same is true of social, human, physical and 
natural capitals: they only are what they are 
because of the broader relationships, practices, 
institutional frameworks and discursive 
formations within which they are caught up. 
What may count as ‘social capital’ or ‘human 
capital’ in one context cannot necessarily 
be so counted in another. For this reason 
even the most simple enumeration of basic 
household assets needs to go beyond simple 
quantification, and has to involve a detailed 
qualitative and relational understanding of 
social processes.
This means that research should go 
beyond a vague and general approach to the 
understanding of the issues that are indicated 
by the rather vague reference to ‘transforming 
structures and processes’ in DFID’s 
diagrammatic representation of the livelihoods 
framework. Forms of analysis and theoretical 
accounts are needed that can mediate between 
different arenas and levels of social process 
– that can link, for example, household-level 
micro-analyses with accounts of global, 
national, regional and subregional processes. 
How this is done varies from context to 
context. In the study of a poverty in a place 
such as Ceres, where industrialised agriculture 
and export food production play such a central 
role, linking the micro-analysis of livelihoods 
to an understanding of broader global-local 
processes has to proceed, as it were, along two 
axes simultaneously, the ‘horizontal’ and the 
‘vertical’ (see Figure 2). 
1. We may imagine the ‘vertical’ axis to 
involve the way in which local livelihoods 
are affected by the restructuring of the 
value chains, commodity chains and agro-
food systems (for example, Kaplinsky 
2000; Raikes & Gibbon 2000; Gibbon 
2001) that link households to the often 
geographically removed places. To vary 
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the metaphor slightly, one needs to look 
both ‘downstream’ (at the ways in which 
products are processed, shipped, marketed 
and consumed), and ‘upstream’ (at the 
relationships that are involved on the 
input side of agricultural production). One 
requires some grasp, in other words, of 
the economics and the politics of agro-
commodity export chains and how they 
affect the details of labour processes and 
production. Key trends in this ‘vertical’ axis 
that directly affect agro-food livelihoods in 
the Ceres region, for instance, are:
• the consolidation of retail power in the 
deciduous fruit industry’s target markets
• the deregulation and restructuring of 
the South African marketing and export 
infrastructure
• the increasing regulation of commodity 
chains through semi-public and private 
quality regimes
• the growing importance of information 
technology (particularly in facilitating 
control and monitoring in the value 
chain)
• the increasing centrality of ‘intangibles’ 
(brands, patents, intellectual property) in 
shaping relations of power
• concentration and consolidation in the 
packing industry after deregulation and 
Figure 2: ‘Vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ processes of mediation in agro-food related livelihoods
Legend
1. Retailer concentration
2. Supply chain control technologies
3. Deregulation of fruit export
4. Changing grower-exporter relations
5. Grower concentration
6. Intellectual property, brands and 
‘intangibles’
7. Local paternalist practices
8. Identity (race, class, culture, gender)
9. Legal form and democratisation




























changing local grower-packer/exporter 
relations.
2. But analyses have to go beyond simplistic, 
reductionist, unidirectional and determinist 
accounts of globalisation (Goodman 
& Watts 1994; Jarosz 1996). What happens 
to farm worker livelihoods in Ceres is not 
simply the direct result of a process of 
globalisation that can be described in some 
a priori way. How globalisation ‘plays’ in 
any particular situation is always locally 
and regionally mediated. The livelihood 
options of farm worker households are 
affected, not only by what happens in 
London or Brussels, but also by the realities 
of local and regional politics, culture and 
practice. As important as the ‘vertical’ 
analysis of the commodity chain is the 
‘horizontal’ analysis of the way livelihoods 
are situated or embedded in a complex local 
social and political context. Some of these 
‘localising’ phenomena that are relevant in 
the case of Ceres are:
• the social and cultural legacy of slave 
society, colonial settlement, segregation, 
white domination and apartheid
• the dominant gender and racial identities 
(and racialised and gendered practices 
and institutions) within this context
• the political dynamics of 
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democratisation, political transition, and 
the provision for universal human rights
• the changing policy and regulatory 
environment, including changing labour 
legislation
• the transformation, restructuring and 
democratisation of local government.
This is a rough and approximate scheme, and 
not all the phenomena that affect livelihoods 
and poverty dynamics can be neatly 
categorised. The dynamics of the formal, 
commercial food system, for instance, are in 
some ways solidly part of ‘vertical’ commodity 
systems of their own, while at the same 
time also being thoroughly enmeshed in the 
‘horizontal’ dynamics of local development 
and social process. Discursive and ideological 
factors such as race, class, gender and cultural 
identity, in addition, make their influence felt 
as much along the vertical, agro-food chain 
axis as in the context of local, regional and 
national politics. 
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White power in an African 
valley
Perhaps the best place to start, then, is with the recognition that chronic poverty in Ceres is shaped above all by the 
nature of the social relations that exist between 
those who own the land – a small, wealthy, 
coherent white local landed elite – and those 
who have to work it to stay alive. The story 
of these relationships is the story of slavery. 
Slavery shaped society at the Cape in profound 
ways, and left its mark on farm owners as 
well as workers (Ross 1983; Watson 1990; 
Crais 1992; Trapido 1994; Rayner 1986). 
Among other things, its centrality to Cape 
society in the 18th century helped create a rural 
landowning class whose sense of itself, and 
whose relationship to the African countryside 
of the Cape, was profoundly influenced by a 
discourse of mastery that linked white identity 
closely with the right to own the land, and 
assumed that ownership of land conferred on 
the owner the right to govern the lives all those 
who worked it. This discourse entrenched and 
regulated the power of a white land-owning 
group bound together by ties of family, 
political affiliation and culture. 
The way in which this elite acted to secure 
its interests and entrench its power is complex 
and can only be sketched in broad strokes here. 
Local government and membership of the most 
important white political parties has clearly 
been central over the years, but a more subtle 
and in some ways more important role has 
been the control of local agro-food institutions, 
the boards of local credit institutions and 
banks, and the ability to use informal networks 
and family connections effectively. In Ceres, 
these have worked to create a local landed 
elite with a subtle but clearly marked internal 
hierarchy dominated by the wealthy ‘old 
money’ of the descendants of the very first 
white settlers. This local elite made effective 
use of the opportunities and institutions created 
by apartheid and its associated agricultural 
policies, in particular the institutional apparatus 
of regulated agriculture. In the 1960s and 
1970s control over Ceres Fruit Growers, at 
3. Change in Ceres
its heyday the largest single fruit packing 
operation in the southern hemisphere, was 
a major source of their power within the 
landowning class, as was their ability to 
influence local land and credit markets (see 
Box 1).
Slavery at the Cape had its consequences 
for workers too. Most importantly it 
contributed to the development of the 
institutions and practices of farm paternalism. 
These worked to legitimate and regulate white 
power at farm level, and locked poor black5 
households into highly authoritarian and 
deeply racialised relationships of servitude 
and dependence (Ross 1983, 1986; Watson 
1990; Dooling 1992). These institutions did 
not fade away with the abolition of slavery 
in 1834, but continued to shape the farming 
styles of landowners and the strategies of 
survival and resistance adopted by workers 
and farm dwellers (Marincowitz 1985; Scully 
1987, 1989, 1997; Crais 1992). By the late 
20th century, the social relations of paternalism 
were still thoroughly entrenched on wine and 
fruit farms throughout the province (Nasson 
1984; Schärf 1984; Du Toit 1993; Waldman 
1993; Ewert & Hamman 1999). Workers 
continued to be profoundly dependent on 
white farm owners. Besides the infamous ‘tot’ 
system (the part-payment of farm workers in 
alcohol), a key role was played by workers’ 
dependence on tied housing. In addition, until 
the early 1990s, farm workers were excluded 
from the provisions of labour legislation and 
the protection of trade unionism. 
Policy and law after 1994
The end of apartheid brought important 
changes. Most obviously, it meant the end 
of the political apparatus that gave whites 
uncontested control over local and national 
government. More concretely and directly for 
fruit and wine farmers, political transition led 
to the consolidation and deepening of policy 
and legislative changes that had already started 
in the mid-1980s. 
These changes are complex and multi-
faceted. Suffice it to say that they involved 
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a simultaneous process of deregulation and 
re-regulation. With regard to labour and social 
regulation, debates since the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s on how poverty and 
inequality are to be addressed have focused 
mostly on extending rights and protections to 
black workers and on dismantling the massive 
regulatory apparatus that protected white 
farmers during the apartheid era (NDA 1998). 
A key role was played by the ANC’s 
adoption of a broadly neoliberal economic 
framework under in the form of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (Gear) 
macroeconomic strategy, the gradual 
relaxation of currency controls, the phasing 
out of the General Export Incentive Scheme 
(GEIS), the tariffication of agricultural import 
restrictions in terms of South Africa’s World 
Trade Organisation commitments, and the 
deregulation of agricultural markets through 
the repeal of the Marketing Act and its 
replacement by the Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act (Bayley 2000). 
In the fruit sector, this meant, most 
concretely, the deregulation of export 
markets and the abolition of what was in 
effect a single-desk export scheme under 
the Deciduous Fruit Board and Unifruco. In 
the Western Cape deciduous fruit industry 
The whole economy of that community was very much controlled by a central group of people based in the farming 
community. It was based in certain families. And there was a passing down of power to the next generation. So 
it would be the Cilliers family. It would be Van Wyks of Lakenvlei. It would be Malherbes. The Conradies of 
Kromfontein. This is now the older generation. It would be the Goosens, in the Hamlet. In the Kouebokkeveld it 
would be the van der Merwes. Not the Van der Merwes of Boplaas; the power went to the second son, who was at 
Bronaar. They would use ‘lieutenants’ to do the groundwork, to gather the information, to lobby with the people who 
might be a little bit dissident. They had people operating at the Boerevereniging,7 at parties, at the golf club, at the 
church. They would have lieutenants like M*** L***. Who is not extremely intelligent, who wants to be part of the 
binnekring,8 and who does the dirty work for them. He would try to fish out what you are busy with and so forth. 
It was a political grouping, it was definitely a Broederbond grouping and they really called the shots in terms of 
the appointment of officials and key people – whether it was in the co-operative, at the school, the principal, whether 
it was ouderlinge9 in the church, whether it was directors on the board of the Co-op. No matter if they had good 
Afrikaner credentials, if [their] political credentials were wrong, they were sidelined. If someone was, for example, 
United Party he would be very subtly disempowered though keeping him out of any position of power even though 
he was a highly capable man. So he would stand for the board of directors of the Co-op but he would have people 
phoning him at night and telling him to stand back. Otherwise there might be some repercussion on the [packing of] 
your fruit down the line. The officials who actually decided on the grading of the product in the Co-op have been 
appointed by so-and-so, so his fruit always gets graded higher, they always get better pack-outs, they always get better 
payments.
Out of these families you would have them on the [board of the] Land Bank. Out of these families you would 
have the assessors who come evaluate your property. They would be on directorships of commercial banks like Volkskas. 
They would also sit in directorships of the Porterville Ko-operasie.10 So they would have insight into everybody’s bank 
accounts, debts etcetera. So they made sure the right people got the Land Bank loans. And that’s how this lot built 
their wealth. That and bandiet11 labour.
Box 1: A Ceres farmer’s wife’s perspective on power politics among white farmers6
this process led in 1998 to the dismantling 
of the Deciduous Fruit Board, the abolition 
of the single desk exporting system, the end 
of Unifruco’s de facto monopoly over fruit 
exports, the merger of Unifruco and Outspan12 
merger and conversion into a private export 
company competing for fruit and markets with 
other South African exporters (NAMC 2000; 
McKenna 2000).
This was accompanied by the re-regulation 
of the labour market through the extension to 
farm workers of basic employment legislation, 
first through the Agricultural Labour 
Act (1993) and later through the Labour 
Relations Act (1995), the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act (1997), the Extension of 
Tenure Security Act (1997), the Employment 
Equity Act (1998), and the Skills Development 
Act (1998). More recently, these were followed 
by the provision of a sectoral determination for 
minimum wages for farm workers in December 
2002 and the extension of unemployment 
insurance legislation to temporary and seasonal 
workers early in 2003. 
During the late 1990s, the white power 
structures built on the wealth generated by 
the fruit export industry were thus subjected 
to new pressures. Not only were the levers 
of direct political control slipping out of 
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white hands, but deregulation fragmented the 
pool system that had protected farmers from 
risk at precisely the same time as increasing 
consolidation of retailer power in the fruit 
industry’s key Northern markets put margins 
under pressure. Farmers who had borrowed 
extensively to finance further development or 
to restructure their orchards found themselves 
suddenly caught between downward pressure 
on producer prices from supermarkets, 
increasing labour and other input costs, and 
increasing interest rates in the wake of the 
1997 Asian economic crisis. By 2000/01, 
economic gloom settled over Ceres district. 
The local branch of Price Waterhouse 
Coopers calculated the average farming debt at 
about R7 million per 50 hectares. Land prices 
flattened – for a while, they were selling at 
half their orchard development costs – and 
a spate of prominent local fruit farms became 
insolvent. In 2002 the economic picture had 
stabilised somewhat – not because the industry 
has become any more efficient or better, but 
mostly because of a further 40% deterioration 
in the exchange rate for local currency. 
However, this respite was short-lived and 
exchange rate fluctuations have continued to 
contribute both to uncertainty and pressures on 
margins. 
Re-configuring power
The effects of these changes on workers 
have been mixed. Though conditions for 
skilled, core and permanent farm workers 
have improved, and though small groups of 
workers have benefited from ‘empowerment’ 
initiatives, many farmers have responded 
to changed conditions by restructuring 
their businesses and shedding labour. It is 
important not to exaggerate or simplify the 
nature of these shifts. Labour intensity in 
agriculture has in any case been decreasing 
since the 1960s. National statistics – which are 
notoriously unreliable – indicate no real shift in 
employment, but a survey by Du Toit and Ally 
(2004) found evidence of an uneven but clear 
shift away from the use of permanent workers 
and towards the use of temporary, seasonal and 
subcontracted labour, particularly among fruit 
farmers. In a survey of 77 wine and fruit farms 
in six Western Cape districts, they found that 
58.7% of farms (and 70% of deciduous fruit 
farms) had reduced their permanent on-farm 
labour force in the previous three years, while 
almost half of respondents (47%) indicated 
plans to decrease labour in the future. The 
effect of these trends is hard to establish, but 
a comparison with the research of Kritzinger et 
al. (1995) shows a significant shift away from 
permanent labour towards seasonal labour 
between 1995 and 2000 (see Table 2). 
These shifts bring about important changes 
in the Western Cape agricultural labour market. 
Not only is there a reduction in the number of 
permanent jobs per hectare, but the nature of 
employment relations – and the composition 
of the labour force itself – is shifting. While 
only 21% of permanent jobs were held by 
women, Du Toit and Ally found that almost 
two-thirds of the harvesting labour force was 
female. In addition Du Toit and Ally found 
a significant shift towards externalisation – the 
provision of labour by third party contractors 
– with some 53% of farms indicating that they 
were making use of contractors. Significantly, 
only 17% of these farms indicated that they 
used labour-only contractors (in other words, 
contractors that act only as ‘brokers’). On 
the remaining 83% of farms they performed 
management services, so that the employment 
relationship was not with the farmer, but with 
the contractor. 
In addition, they found a marked reluctance 
among farmers to continue to provide on-
farm housing for workers, the lynchpin of 
traditional Western Cape farm paternalism. 
Some 11% of the houses on the farms surveyed 
Table 2: Comparison between jobs per hectare in 1995
Regular jobs (per ha) Seasonal workers (per ha)
1995 2000 1995 2000
Whole sample 1.36 0.77 1.32 1.25
Deciduous fruit 1.34 0.56 0.59 1.12
Table grapes 1.95 1.35 2.79 2.17
Sources: Kritzinger et al. 1995 and Du Toit & Ally 2004
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by Ally and Du Toit were standing empty 
while 57% of farmers reported having at least 
one empty worker’s house on the farm. Even 
more importantly, significant numbers of 
respondents indicated an intention to demolish 
worker housing (21%) or to change their use 
(12%). These populations overlapped to some 
extent, but all in all, some 32% of farmers 
in the survey indicated an intention to abjure 
the traditional housing function performed by 
Western Cape wine and fruit farms (see Table 
3). 
Farmers tend to blame these trends on the 
entrenchment of workers’ tenure rights by 
the Extension of Tenure Security Act. On-
farm housing – once seen as an important 
investment by Western Cape farmers – is 
increasingly being regarded as a liability. As 
a result, workers are being moved off farms, 
and end up either in low-cost developments 
or in informal settlements around small 
Western Cape country towns. Interestingly, the 
economic upturn experienced by Ceres farmers 
in 2001/02 shows no sign of reversing these 
trends.
In fact, a look at the profile of Ceres at the 
beginning of the 21st century seems to indicate 
that the coming into power of a black majority 
government in South Africa has not signalled 
the end of white hegemony in the Ceres district 
or elsewhere in the rural Western Cape. True: 








Source: Du Toit & Ally 2004
Ceres now has a black, African National 
Congress mayor. But the machinery of local 
government has not fundamentally changed. 
The white elite that has run the valleys of the 
Witzenberg since the 18th century has not been 
displaced. At most, it has been somewhat 
reorganised. The Van der Merwes have slid 
from their pinnacle at the top of the pecking 
order, and others – such as the Du Toits of 
the Du Toit Group, which in 2002 owned 
more land in the Koue- and Warmbokkeveld 
than anyone else – have risen to prominence. 
Politically, there is also some fragmentation. 
The hegemony of Afrikaner nationalism has 
given way to a much more complex picture 
characterised by formal acceptance of free 
market ideology and non-racialism. The 
language of paternalism has not disappeared, 
but has mutated to include in its lexicon 
concepts of ‘empowerment’ and ‘sustainable 
development’. Paternalism and networks of 
patronage continue to shape the life chances 
and livelihood options of the poor.
In this paper, it will not be possible to 
explore in depth the discourses and practices of 
local government, and to show the continuities 
and discontinuities with the past. Rather, 
attention will focus on showing the extent and 
nature of the continued dependence of poor 
households on a seasonal agricultural labour 
market for their survival, and the implications 
of this for chronic poverty.
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Research approach
What do these shifts mean for the poor households who depend on industrialised agriculture for their 
livelihoods, and who are no longer part of the 
ambiguous implicit contract of paternalism? 
Little attention has been paid to this issue. 
Although policy and advocacy work in South 
Africa includes an awareness of the concerns 
and problems of farm workers, this concern 
has been almost entirely focussed on the 
situation of permanent and on-farm workers. 
Research on poverty and social conditions 
among farm workers has tended to focus 
heavily on permanent and on-farm workers 
(for example, Du Toit 1993; Kritzinger et al. 
1995), and has tended to focus fairly narrowly 
on labour conditions (wages, conditions of 
employment, implementation of legislation) 
(Sunde & Kleinbooi 1999). The same is true of 
policy and advocacy work, which is dominated 
by NGOs and unions focusing mostly on 
permanent workers as a clientele, and by a 
overriding concern with employment relations, 
labour legislation and the regulation of on-
farm tenure. Seasonal and ‘casual’ off-farm 
workers are almost invisible in the debate (for 
an important exception, see Barrientos 2001, 
Kritzinger & Barrientos 2004 and the work of 
the Women on Farms Project).
The survey discussed in this paper sought 
to redress this balance, firstly by focusing 
on off-farm communities, and secondly by 
investigating household livelihood profiles 
and outcomes in a much more encompassing 
way. This involved a detailed in-depth 
household livelihood survey of four selected 
poor neighbourhoods in the Ceres area. The 
research involved a survey covering a wide 
range of key livelihoods issues, including 
income, expenditure, household assets, access 
to natural resources, social and human capital, 
anthropometric and health-related data. This 
research was supplemented by a follow-up 
study involving in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with selected households. 
The design of the survey and the 
interpretation of the results are informed 
4. Off-farm poverty in Ceres
by research insights and understandings 
arising from a much longer-term research 
involvement in the area. Since 1998 this 
research has involved in-depth interviews 
with fruit farmers and farm workers, contact 
and collaboration with local NGOs and trade 
unions, consultation in the restructuring of 
the fruit packing industry, and episodes of 
participant observation working alongside 
fruit farm workers in local orchards and 
packing houses (Du Toit & Moosa 1998; 
Du Toit 2000, 2001; Du Toit & Ally 2004). 
The target areas were selected on the basis of 
participatory social mapping exercises with 
local NGOs, local government and civil society 
organisations. In order to ensure some level of 
comparability and possibility for extrapolation 
with other survey data, the survey used the 
same boundaries as the South African Census’s 
enumerator areas. Four key focus areas were 
selected, each representing a significantly 
different scenarios:
1. Zone 3 in Bella Vista. Bella Vista, situated 
some 5km from the periphery of Ceres, is 
the town’s coloured13 township. The area as 
a whole as a mixed socio-economic profile, 
and many middle-class coloured people 
are still settled on the hillside facing the 
highway – an area known colloquially as 
ou blok (‘old block’). Out of sight of the 
highway, a dense settlement of low-cost, 
subeconomic housing has mushroomed in 
the last five years. This area, formally Zone 
3, is colloquially known as vaalbarraks 
(‘grey barracks’) and the kleinhuisies 
( literally ‘tiny houses’ – but kleinhuisie 
also is a slang for an outside toilet). 
This last name refers to the nature of the 
subeconomic housing, which is cookie-
cutter Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) format: single-brick, 
two-room dwellings with running water, 50-
amp electricity and flush toilets, squatting 
in the middle of a lot of bare ground.
2. Op die Berg (literally, ‘On the Mountain’) 
is a ‘agri-village’ in the high valleys of the 
Kouebokkeveld. Originally hardly a town 
– just a church, a post office and a small 
cluster of houses belonging mostly to local 
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farm managers – it has seen significant 
expansion in the last decade as a dormitory 
town for locally-employed farm workers. 
On the north side of the river, where some 
retired farmers are now settled, it is still 
white and wealthy: the streets are wide and 
tarred, homes are spacious, and gardens are 
lush. South of the river is where coloured 
farm workers live. Many of them have been 
settled here by local farmers and still have 
permanent jobs on those farms. Some of 
the houses have been built by the farmers 
themselves and are much better than RDP 
standard. More recently, however, a large 
number of RDP houses have been built.
3. Nduli (literally, ‘The Hill’), 5km away 
along the Laingsburg road, is Ceres’s 
formal African township. This alone is 
unusual: most small Western Cape country 
towns do not have an African township 
at all. Ceres is exceptional partly because 
of the long-established pattern of larger 
farmers importing migrant workers from 
the Eastern Cape during harvest season. 
Figure 3: Map of the Ceres area The oldest section of Nduli is the hostel 
area where those migrant workers were 
originally housed. Today the hostels no 
longer provide temporary housing; they 
house ex-migrants and their families or – in 
a significant number of cases – households 
still composed of single African men. 
4. On the western edge of Nduli there is 
an extensive informal settlement. The 
largest part of this settlement is known as 
Polo Cross (after the polo grounds which 
originally existed on the site). In the last 
five years, a new settlement has grown up 
in the land between Polo Cross, the local 
school and the highway: this area is known 
as Mooiblom (‘Pretty Flower’).
Dimensions of poverty
The nature of chronic poverty in Bella Vista, 
Nduli and Op die Berg are determined by 
a number of intersecting and overlapping 
dynamics.
Dependency on agriculture
The central and most important element of 
poverty among households surveyed was their 
high degree of reliance on cash incomes. This 
was related to a broad and severe lack of access 
to economic capital and natural resources. Only 
11% of households in the survey indicated 
that they had access to land for a food garden 
– and this was due largely to a large percentage 
of households in Nduli involved in a food 
gardening scheme (see Table 5). Less than 1% 
had access to grazing land, and less than 0.5% 
had access to fields for cultivation. It is also 
notable that residents of Bella Vista and Op 
die Berg – the formal township developments 
– had less access to these resources than the 
predominantly African residents of Nduli and 
the informal shack town of Mooiblom. Some 
96% of households owned no livestock of any 
kind. Where households did own livestock, 
these were mostly chickens.
Linked to this was the relative importance 
of paid employment and cash income to 
Table 4: A profile of adults in the Ceres survey
Male Female Total
Bella Vista 174 222 396
Nduli hostels 63 62 125
Nduli Mooiblom 159 171 330
Op die Berg 233 262 495
 629 717 1 346
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households’ general poverty status. Households 
reported a low level of reliance on natural 
resources. Outside of the collection of wood 
from pruned orchards as an energy source, 
households had to buy most of what they 
needed. Households that were cash-poor were 
unlikely to own significant economic capital, 
either in the form of savings, access to land 
for food gardening, or livestock. Cash-poor 
households were poor in household resources 
and infrastructure. (Some aspects of this lack 
of resources eluded measurement in the survey: 
while the questionnaire surveyed ownership of 
items like radios, refrigerators, stoves and other 
minor capital items, anecdotal evidence during 
the survey showed that some of the poorer 
households owned no furniture at all, living in 
an empty box, sleeping on scavenged sponge 
mattresses and using milk crates for chairs.) 
There was also a strong correlation between 
income poverty and reported food insecurity. 
In the context of this lack of access to land 
and resources for household food production, 
and with the absence of much linkage to a 
social hinterland of subsistence agriculture, it 
is no surprise that the major focus of household 
livelihood strategies was access to cash and 
paid employment. Eighty percent of household 
income, on average, was derived from salaries, 
casual work and seasonal employment. In 
the survey, employment was identified by 
Table 5: Household access to land for food production (% of households)
Bella Vista Nduli hostels Nduli 
Mooiblom
Op die Berg Whole 
sample
Meadow/ field for grazing 0.60 4.26 0.73 0.00 0.74
Fields for cultivation 0.00 4.26 0.00 0.00 0.37
Food garden 2.40 37.50 17.52 6.99 10.97
respondents as household members’ most 
pressing need in 38% of cases, more than 
double as common as the next most prevalent 
identified need (housing, at 18%).
In this context, perhaps the most serious 
immediate and direct cause of income poverty 
was the insufficiency and insecurity of 
paying jobs. Respondents indicated that some 
38.7% of adult household members below 
the age of 65 had no paid employment of any 
kind. Almost 20% of households reported 
that there was no person older than 18 with 
paid employment in the household. About 
a third (35%) of households reported that all 
adults had some paid employment – usually 
indicating a situation where adults held a mix 
of different seasonal, temporary and permanent 
jobs. Unemployment and job loss were far 
and away the two most common forms of 
livelihood shocks households had received 
in the previous year. More than a third of 
households reported that they had suffered 
‘general unemployment in the household’ in 
the last year, 25% reported the loss of work by 
a breadwinner in the previous year, and 35% 
reported the loss of a permanent job during the 
last five years. 
Where households had access to work, it 
was most often farm work. Almost 40% of 
household members with access to paid work 
were reported to have spent some time doing 
Table 6: Main sectors of employment for employed adults
Category Number %
Farmwork on commercial farm 260 31.98
Other unskilled 145 17.84
Service/retail sector 124 15.25
Food sector employment 123 15.13
Public service 57 7.01
Domestic work 45 5.54
Own employment 35 4.31
Non-food sector employment 24 2.95
Forgotten by the highway: Globalisation, adverse incorporation 
and chronic poverty in a commercial farming district
16
wage labour in the agricultural sector, while 
for some 32% of household members with 
paid employment, farm work was reported as 
their most important wage-earning activity. 
The next categories – ‘other unskilled work’ 
and employment in the service sector – were 
half as common as farm work. Some 16% of 
household members with employment were 
mainly active in the agro-food processing 
sector (usually employed in one of the large 
fruit packing houses in the region). All in 
all, half of the households in the survey with 
access to paid employment were directly linked 
to the fruit industry in some way or other.
Respondents indicated that only 26% of 
the members of the households surveyed had 
access to a stable, permanent job. Households 
often combined permanent and/or seasonal 
incomes, so that some 31% of households were 
in some way dependent on seasonal labour 
for income in part of the year in one way or 
another, and 25% of households were entirely 
dependent on seasonal or temporary labour. 
These factors together have a depressing 
influence on income levels. Average incomes 
were some R1 174 per month – R341 per 
adult-equivalent household member. Just less 
than two-thirds of households (65.2%) were 
therefore below the 2002 official poverty 
datum line of R352 per household. These 
already low figures however conceal the 
relative variability of incomes (see Figure 4). 
Household incomes fluctuated by an average 
of 23% of maximum values, with the seasonal 
fluctuation in Bella Vista and Nduli closer to 
40%. 
Seasonal employment: Power and 
dependency
In this context, employment in the agro-food 
sector played a complex and ambiguous role 
in the lives of poor households. An important 
factor here is the nature and structure of the 
social power relations that surround seasonal 
and temporary employment on fruit farms in 
Ceres. 
Here it is important to understand that 
the seasonal labour requirements of fruit 
farmers are defined by the need to combine 
and reconcile divergent and sometimes 
conflicting imperatives. These imperatives are 
decisively shaped by the technical and material 
constraints of fruit production. Not only is 
fruit production characterised by seasonally 
changing tasks and labour requirements, 
within each season it is also marked by a high 
degree of unpredictability and risk (Du Toit & 
Moosa 1998). The optimal times for any task 
is determined by a multitude of factors, only 
some of which are in the control of farmers, 
and changing weather can play havoc with 
day-to-day or weekly planning. A well-planned 
fruit farm is set up so that the season is long 
(with early and late varieties) and even (with 
different varieties ripening in sequence, so that 
the same workers can deal with each in turn). 
But weather and other unpredictable factors 
can play havoc with this sequence, so that in 
any harvest time any farm can at a given time 
have too much work (or, more rarely, too 
little). 
In this context, the market in seasonal and 
temporary employment is shaped by the desire 
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of farmers to have access to sufficient numbers 
of adequately skilled workers at the lowest 
possible price when demand is at its peak, 
while being able to avoid carrying any extra 
workers at all during times when there is no 
demand, or when there is no work to be done. 
This is not always easy. Pruning, thinning 
and even picking deciduous fruit requires 
significant care and skill. While employment 
in the low season is scarce, even for skilled 
workers, they are often in short supply during 
the high season. Ways have to be found to 
build relationships with workers between 
seasons, so that farm managers can be sure that 
workers will be available. At the same time this 
has to be balanced against the desire of farm 
owners for high degrees of flexibility, and their 
reluctance to enter easily into hard and fast 
commitments. 
Over the years, in response to these needs, 
a wide range of labour-sourcing strategies have 
developed among farm managers and owners. 
These are shaped, not only by the exigencies of 
a free market in labour, but also the accidents 
of history, culture and geography. These have 
led, in the first place, to a labour market that 
is highly spatially diverse and segmented. 
In the Ceres region, smaller farmers have 
historically tended to carry more labour than 
they need for the low season and less than their 
peak demand, coping with these differences 
by swapping workers among one another as 
the harvest progressed. Nearby towns such as 
Ceres itself, Wolseley, and Prince Alfred’s 
Hamlet have also provided farms with seasonal 
labour, while other farms have long relied on 
teams of seasonal workers trekking into the 
fruit farming regions from the arid and much 
poorer Karoo region. Many of these have 
settled in the area. At the time of writing, few 
of the farm workers living in Bella Vista are 
‘Ceresiete’; they are far more likely to hail 
from Williston, Sutherland or Calvinia.
On larger farms, particularly in the higher 
valleys of the Kouebokkeveld, during the 
apartheid years farmers relied heavily on 
African migrant workers from the Eastern 
Cape, recruiting workers through labour 
brokers or ‘boss boys’ in the Eastern Cape, 
transporting them to Ceres for the season and 
either shipping them back afterwards or simply 
expecting them to make their own way back 
to the bantustans. ‘Good’ workers would often 
be given a token or document that would give 
them priority for the next season’s recruitment. 
These patterns of employment have led to the 
establishment of long-range networks often 
linking particular farms in the Ceres area 
with particular villages and districts such as 
Sterkspruit in the Eastern Cape. 
The forms of the relationships with seasonal 
workers have also been fairly diverse. While 
some workers have no long-term relationships 
with the farms on which they work, others 
will be part of teams that keep returning 
again and again to the same farm or set of 
farms (sometimes the very farms from which 
they have been evicted or where they held 
permanent jobs in the past). Some farms have 
chosen to deal directly with their seasonal 
labour, employing people on short-term 
contracts for the duration of the harvest season. 
In some cases, self-organised seasonal 
teams approach farm management directly. 
More usually, management will make use of 
brokers and middlemen or women to put them 
in touch with available workers. Then there is 
the trend already mentioned towards relying on 
‘externalised’ labour strategies where workers 
are provided by a contractor. For farmers, the 
latter arrangement potentially holds significant 
risks and important advantages, partly because 
with contractors, farm management does not 
form part of the employment relationship. In 
some ways this makes control much more 
difficult for farmers used to the ability to 
command workers directly. But where quality 
controls can be put in place, the onerous nature 
of legislation and the burden of administration 
on the employer makes externalised labour 
relationships of his nature increasingly 
attractive to farm managers, because it allows 
farm management to pass on many direct and 
indirect costs and risks to the labour contractor. 
In Ceres, some farmers have turned this into 
an art form, managing to make contractors 
responsible even for the employment 
relationship with on-farm workers (see Box 2).
The seasonal labour market that has 
resulted is characterised by highly unequal 
power relationships. Farmers and workers do 
not encounter one another in a completely 
open market with equal access to information. 
Rather, farmers pursue arrangements that allow 
them to pay as little as possible for the labour 
they need, and that allow them to displace 
downwards – or to externalise onto labour 
contractors and seasonal workers – the risks 
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associated with the uncertainties of agricultural 
production. In these systems of relationship, an 
important role is played by brokers, mediators, 
contractors, and contact people on whom both 
farmers and workers rely for access to jobs and 
labour. 
These relationships can take a wide 
variety of forms. At one extreme is the almost 
ubiquitous importance of family relationship 
as the basis of claims to get access to both 
permanent and seasonal employment: one 
of the most basic prerequisites for access to 
an opportunity at any workplace is to have 
a family member or other connection already 
working there. At the other extreme, for 
those who are able to play a decisive role 
in organising these networks, the rise of a 
contract labour market gives the opportunity 
of developing their own networks of patronage 
and power, or to extend those networks 
that already exist. Perhaps the most striking 
example in Ceres is the involvement in labour 
contracting of a notorious local gang known 
as the Red Devils. Originally a gang of 
smokkelaars15 involved in illicit liquor sales, 
the drug trade and extortionate moneylending, 
their core activities now are intricately tangled 
up in the labour contracting business. The 
100–120 workers who are reputedly employed 
The labour arrangements in place at ‘The Grange’, a farm nestled against the Ezelfontein road running south-east of 
Ceres provide a good example of some of the ways in which externalisation has been used to pass costs on to labour 
contractors. This farm has in the last five years gone through a significant process of labour-shedding. Permanent, on-farm 
posts have been reduced to a third of their former level, and most of the pruning, thinning and harvesting is done by 
a team of workers brought back to the farm each season by a contractor, ‘Jacob Linnie’. The farmer negotiates overall 
prices with the contractor (that is, in harvest time, based on a cost per bin of fruit). From this price the contractor has 
to recover his or her own costs and margin as well as pay workers. Furthermore, during the season, permanent workers 
on the farm are formally under the control of ‘Linnie’. The contractor pays these workers on exactly the same basis 
as he pays the workers he brings in from Wolseley and Bella Vista. Furthermore, the owner of the farm invoices the 
contractor for the cost of the on-farm workers’ provident funds and housing – effectively ensuring that off-farm workers 
are subsidising the salary packages of the on-farm workers!
Box 2: How contracting arrangements help one farmer externalise the costs of on-farm 
labour14
by them notionally earn R200 per week, but 
are also provided each week with food from 
‘mobiles’ (small, local food vendors often 
doing business from a trailer) controlled by the 
gang – and with ‘papsakke’ (5-litre foil bags 
of low-grade wine). Not only has the infamous 
tot system almost literally been re-invented 
and adapted to off-farm use, but the contractor 
profits three times – from the contract with the 
farmer, from the sale of the food, and from the 
sale of the wine.16
Reliance on seasonal employment 
in agriculture therefore has important 
implications. It is not simply a matter of 
the quality and nature of its contribution to 
the cash incomes of poor households. It is 
also a matter of the role of the networks and 
relationships of patronage and other forms of 
connection – ‘social capital’, in livelihoods 
framework terms – that shape the ability of 
household members to get access to seasonal 
jobs. These relationships play an ambiguous 
role in the perpetuation of poverty. While 
they play an important role in ensuring basic 
survival, they also tie poor households into 
networks of obligation and power relations 
that in the long run may not work to their 
advantage.
Table 8: Households reporting ‘hungry periods’, by site
Site No. of households % of households in site
Bella Vista 137 82.04
Nduli hostels 37 77.08
Nduli Mooiblom 104 75.91
Op die Berg 99 53.22
Total 377 70.07
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The hungry months: The costs of 
seasonality
One of the most important areas of stress 
experienced by households in the survey 
related to food security. Some 70% of 
respondents indicated that their households 
had experienced a food shortage at some 
time during the previous 12 months. Some 
25.8% of children exhibited a degree of 
stunting, 13.6 % were underweight and slightly 
less than 3% showed evidence of wasting. 
Interestingly, reported food shortages seemed 
to be more prevalent in Bella Vista – where 
mean incomes were higher – than in the two 
African settlements. This may be related to the 
higher dependence on seasonal labour in that 
community, but it could also be linked to the 
fact that informal settlement dwellers need less 
cash for municipal rates and taxes. 
Hunger certainly showed a strongly 
seasonal character, with the number of 
households reporting hunger more than 
doubling between March and July (see 
Figure 6). While 27% of households did 
not experience any hungry months, 13% of 
households reported insufficient food year-
round. There is also a significant clustering of 
hungry households around the figure of eight 
hungry months. Interestingly, breaking down 
these figures by income level shows that 38% 
of households in the highest income quintile 
still reported hungry months: the mean income 
level of households not reporting hungry 
months was R591 per member per month, or 
more than R2 500 per household. Respondents 
calculated that their households, on average, 
spent 43% of their expenditure on food. 
Overheads associated with housing – rent, 
energy costs, and municipal rates – cost about 
20% of their expenditure.
Social capital, gender and hidden labour
In this context, the nature of the social relations 
within and among households plays an 
important role in shaping the survival strategies 
of household members. Four key points stand 
out with particular importance here. 
The first is the comparative thinness of 
formal associational life among households 
in the survey. Churches and religious 
organisations form by far the most important 
formal social organisation – 78% of 
respondents reported that a household member 
belonged to one – with funeral associations 
(27%) and youth groups (20%) relatively far 
behind. Less than 6% of households reported 
that a member belonged to a parent-teacher 
association; political party membership 
stood at 7%; and less than 1% of respondents 
indicated membership of a savings association 
or a community credit organisation. 
Secondly, formal associations seemed to 
play very little role in the immediate survival 
strategies of households. Claims for help 
and assistance are based mostly on blood 
relationship. Questioned about whom they 
turned to when they needed support or help, 
most households indicated that they relied 
primarily on immediate family (67%), then 
family friends and extended family (17% and 
6% respectively), with the next categories 
– employers (4%) and the church (3%) 
– following far behind. Qualitative follow-up 
interviews suggest that help could take the 
form of lending money, providing some basic 
foodstuffs, or even allowing hungry relations 
to share a meal. The widespread distribution 
of poverty, however, meant that the help 
available from these networks is often limited: 
the relations to which poor households seemed 
likely to be poor themselves – often help is 
simply not forthcoming. 
The functioning of these family networks 
depends on context. There are some 
indications, for example, that one of the 
reasons why seasonal food insecurity in Op 
die Berg is less acute than in Bella Vista is that 
many residents are still fairly directly linked 
via family structures to people who are still 
on farms. Development workers in Op die 
Berg argue that these links are an important 
source of food (in kind) during hard times.17 
If this is so, a key aspect of life in Bella Vista 
is not only that there is a high reliance on 
seasonal labour and that people are exposed 
to municipal service delivery charges, but 
that people are relatively more cut-off from 
networks that would allow some kind of 
transfer to them of the ‘fringe benefits’ of the 
paternalist contract.
Thirdly, the functioning of these networks 
is powerfully shaped by gender. Qualitative 
interviews seem to indicate that the essential 
labour of ‘working’ family connections for 
support is primarily done by women. Even 
when the family connection itself was to a 
paternal relation, it would usually be women 
who did the work of asking for help, and 
women who provided the help. This, of course, 
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is far from surprising: it forms part of the 
broader way in which gender relations work 
to subject women particularly heavily to the 
burdens of poverty. 
One key aspect of this process is the 
marginalisation of women within the job 
market. While women constituted 60% of 
those without any paid work, and 61% of those 
who were seasonally employed, men made 
up almost 65% of those who had permanent 
positions. These statistics are related to the 
patriarchal family ideology that maintains 
men’s supremacy in the household and 
constructs them as primarily breadwinners, 
and which thus legitimates the temporary 
nature of much female employment (Barrientos 
2000, 2001). As the survey showed, this also 
produced a situation in which women were 
responsible for doing the often invisible work 
of household reproduction (see Table 9). 
Unsurprising as these patterns are, they 
bear some further discussion. The relative 
passivity of men within the networks of family 
assistance and in household production is 
sustained and legitimised by the discourses 
of patriarchy and male supremacy. These 
discourses and ideologies form an important 
part of men’s ability to make use of ‘social 
capital’. But their implication for men seems 
to be ambiguous and two-edged. Patriarchal 
power has its ironies among poor households. 
The privileged status of men is linked to their 
notional role as breadwinners in a social and 
economic context where that role is particularly 
fragile. On paternalist farms, the discourses of 
mastery, servitude and masculinity interact in 
complex ways – subjecting male permanent 
workers to the authority of the white farmer, 
while the status of plaasman18 entrenches some 
degree of authority within the farm worker 
household. Off-farm, in the context of the 
scarcity and the insecurity of any form of paid 
employment, the discourses that sustain poor 
black masculinity are much more subject to 
crisis. 
Fourthly, this seems to be at least one of the 
conditions for the emergence of increasingly 
prevalent and effective – but seriously 
destructive – forms of social capital in these 
communities: the networks and brotherhoods 
of gang life. This raises complex issues for 
social research. In the first place, an analysis 
of livelihood strategies underscores Murray’s 
warning of the internal conflictuality of 
community life and the existence of highly 
exploitative dynamics among and between 
households (Murray 2001). Not everything 
that can be listed within the ‘asset pentagons’ 
used to inventory household resources in the 
DFID livelihoods model is necessarily the 
Table 9: Reported activities for more than one hour a day, by sex*
Activity Men Women
Self-employed (non food) 68.57% 31.43%
Fetching wood 67.00% 33.00%
Food gardening 61.26% 38.74%
Other 56.90% 43.10%
Studying 50.91% 49.09%
Employment (agro-food) 48.75% 51.25%
Looking for work 43.53% 56.47%
Self-employed (agro-food) 40.00% 60.00%
Shopping 26.62% 73.38%
Homework/ Domestic work 26.16% 73.84%
Fetching water 25.00% 75.00%
Caring for children 21.93% 78.07%
Caring for aged 21.62% 78.38%
Caring for sick 20.00% 80.00%
Caring for disabled 15.38% 84.62%
* Percentages refer to the total number of individuals involved in that activity
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kind of private or public good policymakers 
would approve of. It bears thinking about that, 
in all of these communities, the ability to use 
(and to survive) violence, for instance, is a key 
‘capability’ or form of human capital and that, 
for some households, participation in criminal 
networks and associations is a very successful 
livelihood activity. Secondly, these phenomena 
are hidden from survey type research. So 
while crime – extortion, debt racketeering and 
the illicit selling of alcohol and drugs – are 
invisible in the dataset, they were clearly 
a prominent feature of the social scene in 
Bella Vista and Nduli. Anecdotal evidence 
from some key informants indicate that 
‘smokkelary’,19 usually denoting unlicensed 
trade in alcohol, is much more prevalent as 
a livelihood strategy than is generally thought. 
In fact, it probably denotes the most common 
form of entrpreneurial activity among poor 
households. 
This takes a wide range of forms. At the 
one end of the scale, there is ‘opportunist’ 
smokkelary, where an individual with some 
ready cash may get involved in selling beer 
or cheap wine on credit at inflated prices, for 
example, to raise money to pay school fees 
or settle a municipal debt. Further along the 
continuum there are entrepreneurs who are 
consistently involved in the illicit alcohol 
and drug trade as a medium to long-term 
livelihood strategy. Their operations may be 
relatively informal and individual in nature, 
or may be more organised and centred in 
jaarts20 or smokkelhuise.21 Every street in the 
poorer sections of Bella Vista, Nduli and Op 
die Berg will have one or more such jaarts, 
often surrounded by high walls, guarded by 
dogs, and staffed by jaartboys22 who serve as 
bodyguards, merchants, marketers and sources 
of information. In some cases, some of these 
operators – the aforementioned Red Devils 
and the Garass family in Bella Vista are key 
examples – have become quite powerful and 
are widely reputed to have influence even 
within the local police force and Magistrate’s 
Court. Even more alarmingly, some of the 
local smokkelhuise have reputedly entered into 
a relationship with large, well-organised gangs 
from Cape Town such as the Americans and 
the Sexy Boys. 
In all these cases, the existence of these 
forms of criminal organisation are intricately 
linked to the ability of local elites and 
entrepreneurs to make use of their own 
networks and relationships of clientelism and 
patronage. Even relatively small operators can 
already command significant social and human 
capital as well, and can be relatively influential 
in their immediate community, and some may 
even be willing to donate significant amounts 
of their expertise in the cause of ‘community 
development’ (see Box 3). 
It is important to take note of the ways in 
which some of these networks replicate and re-
invent some of the institutions of paternalism, 
as is so evocatively illustrated by the example 
of the Red Devils. This is the ambiguity and 
double-sided nature of these networks. It is 
not enough simply to see, say the structures 
of the Church, as benevolent and those of the 
gangsters as predatory. Rather, these structures 
contain within themselves both the possibility 
of assisting (some of) the poor, and significant 
room for exploitation and the manipulation of 
power relationships.
Politics, power, passivity
Finally, any account of the persistence of 
poverty in the townships of Bella Vista, Nduli 
and Op die Berg has to consider their striking 
cultural and political marginality. In Ceres, the 
most important example of this is the lack of 
public participation, particularly by the poor, in 
the formulation of the consultative ‘Integrated 
Development Plan’ that all municipalities 
are enjoined to develop in terms of local 
government legislation. However, this is only 
one example of a more general pattern of 
public political passivity and demobilisation. 
Again, space is lacking to consider 
the reasons in all their complexity. The 
most obvious contributing factor is the 
abovementioned character of social relations, 
and the huge dependence of poor people on 
patron client relations, but this only one factor 
among many. A thorough discussion would 
have to consider in much more depth, for 
example, the way in which the farmed districts 
of the Western Cape have been constructed 
since 1994 either as sites of commercial (and 
therefore primarily white) agricultural activity, 
or commodified as a picturesque sites for 
‘consumption’ by (primarily Northern and 
European) tourists. Closely related to this 
are the continuities with the legacy of spatial 
apartheid, including the highly racialised land 
tenure patterns on the farms and the persistent 
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racialisation of public space, which lives on 
in the segmentation of Ceres into ‘white’, 
‘coloured’ and ‘black’ (African) areas. 
Another role is played by the nature of the 
dominant political culture in the Western Cape, 
and the discourses and political frameworks 
available for making public sense out of the 
needs and claims of poor people. On the one 
hand, there is a paternalist and demobilising 
discourse of development, in which poor black 
people are constructed as agtergeblewene 
gemeenskappe (‘left-behind communities’). 
This framework generally works to render 
invisible the power relations and conflicts that 
keep poor people poor, and construct them 
essentially as passive recipients of training and 
developmental largesse. On the other, there 
is the discourse of popular mobilisation still 
articulated by unions and NGOs, who are much 
more critical and aware of power relations, 
but who essentially still attempt to mobilise 
poor people in terms of the adversarial and 
confrontational political traditions of the 
1980s. Important as those traditions have been 
in the past, they are ill-suited to new political 
alignments of post-apartheid South Africa, not 
to mention the practices of accommodation, 
negotiation, and ‘off-stage manoeuvring’ – the 
‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) – essential 
for survival in day-to-day life for those lacking 
in power.
These factors, among others, mean that 
in spite of the transition to democracy and 
hegemony of discourses of public consultation 
that highlight the importance of ‘participation’, 
poor people in Ceres and beyond still tend to 
be objects of development, not agents in the 
process of public policymaking at national and 
‘Freddie Arends’ is a large, shambling man, whose physical size and self-assured demeanour immediately mark him out 
as an outsider among the slightly built, soft spoken people of the Kouebokkeveld. He grew up in Cape Town, where 
involvement in gang life soon led to a term in prison. Moving to Ceres in 1999 after his release he forsook for a while 
the organised and violent life of the gangs and tried to make a living as a farm worker, but soon grew disillusioned with 
the hard work, poor pay and the domineering attitude of white farmers. 
He now runs a small smokkel operation in Op Die Berg, and depicts himself as a rebel against white authority: 
The reason why people smuggle is because they want to be their own boss. My reason why I smuggle is I cannot 
stand the farmers. I cannot understand how you can take a man’s sweat and turn it into gold and put it in your 
own bank account…. Meanwhile I am sitting at home my wife and kids are starving. So I decide no fuck, I have 
responsibilities to my family.
He sells about 25 cases of beer a week from which he realises a profit of about R400 – more than twice what a farm 
worker would earn. Some of his profits come from his mark-ups on credit, and some from the difference between 
specials in Cape Town and prices in Ceres, but mostly his margin is provided by the return value of the empty bottles. 
He regards himself as a businessman first and foremost, couching his account of his operation in the language of modern 
business management and discoursing knowledgeably about ‘target markets’, ‘disposable income’ and ‘role players’. He 
prides himself on his sharp mind: Ek smokkel met my gedagtes en nie met my bek nie man. (I smuggle with my thoughts, 
not my mouth, man). 
He sees himself as a benefactor to his community and has indeed played a significant part in local empowerment and 
development initiatives. In the winter of 2002, he deliberately took part in a local public works project – building a 
bridge across the river that separates black and white in Op die Berg – and subsequently he has struck up a relationship 
with a local NGO, which he has started assisting in the formulation of development proposals and business plans. He 
is clearly very proud of his involvement here, and of the many hours of his own time that he has donated to community 
affairs for free: 
I can work. But I just don’t want to work for a farmer. I left these offices quarter past six on Sunday morning 
because I was helping them. Now you must think what it is for a smuggler to sit on Saturday night to Sunday 
morning quarter past six to develop business proposals for government for a fucking sum of money that they might 
just possibly get. I must be stupid, because what’s happening to my bloody business? But I am willing to make 
sacrifices so that I can show these cunts: I too can do it. You say you are headmasters. You say you are church 
ministers. But not one of you is fucking prepared to give up your time for fuck all to come sit here and debate and 
argue and after that to write and write and then to print it out and then to submit [the proposal]. Not one of 
them. But they are so fucking quick to get up in a meeting and to complain about the smugglers. What I say is you 
get two kinds of smugglers. You get a smuggler who is a smuggler first. And you get a smuggler who is a human 
being first. And that smuggler is a person who is sustaining his community. Not his community sustaining him. He is 
carrying the community. He puts the community’s interests first.
Box 3: Pen sketch of ‘Freddie Arends’ – Smokkelaar, rebel, social entrepreneur
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local level. Democracy has not been irrelevant 
to the off-farm poor in Ceres. Development 
and legislation has certainly brought benefits 
to them. But public policy has not effectively 
addressed either its underlying determinants 
or its most debilitating consequences. In 
important ways, the empowering consequences 
of democracy has passed them by. 
Modernising chronic poverty
Poverty in the Ceres district – as elsewhere in 
the Western Cape countryside – is not new. It 
is not a product of globalisation and agro-food 
restructuring. But these processes are helping 
change its character, making it harsher and 
more desperate. 
This is not without its ironies. Poverty 
has been a condition of existence for farm 
workers in the Western Cape for as long as 
there have been farms in this part of Africa. 
First slavery and then the institutionalisation 
of authoritarian paternalism after slavery’s 
demise worked to lock black workers into 
dependence on a labour system in which they 
were usually harshly exploited and often 
brutalised. The practices and discourses of 
mastery and servitude inherited from slavery 
persisted deep into the 20th century. This legacy 
has decisively influenced the nature of policy 
debates and scholarship on inequality and 
poverty in the Western Cape. Discussions on 
encouraging equitable change and eradicating 
poverty have tended to see the problem in the 
Western Cape as being simply the persistence 
of these atavistic forms into modern times, 
and have assumed that the liberation of 
farm workers from poverty and exploitation 
basically required the completion of the 
project of modernisation. For commentators 
on the left, this would be accomplished by the 
extension to farm workers of industrial-style 
trade unionism, while for others the key force 
for change would be the free market. 
This analysis fundamentally misread the 
nature of poverty, power and social relations in 
the Western Cape. (For a brief discussion see 
Du Toit & Ewert 2002.) Paternalist farming 
styles and the discourses of white mastery 
as they existed in the Western Cape at the 
end of the 20th century were not semi-feudal 
vestiges of the past; they were thoroughly 
modern, ‘mutant formations’ – and open 
to further adaptation and transformation 
under changing conditions. The underlying 
modernisation thesis of the policy debates was 
however unquestioned, and eventually policy 
encompassed both market deregulation and the 
extension of industrial-style labour relations. 
White farmers, politically marginalised but still 
holding significant amounts of social power 
and economic capital, were well placed to 
make sure that these transformations happened 
largely on their own terms. An unsystematic 
and uneven but apparently irreversible process 
of casualisation and externalisation seems to 
have been one of the most important results. 
These changes may amount to perhaps the 
most fundamental revision of farm paternalism 
since the introduction of ‘masters and servants’ 
legislation in the middle of the 19th century. 
For a minority of workers – those skilled 
enough to hold on to ‘core’ jobs on large 
wine and fruit farms – these changes may 
be positive. But for many more workers, the 
shift from ‘subject’ to ‘citizen’ involves the 
exchange of the authoritarian racial hierarchies 
and ambiguous protection of the paternalist 
‘contract’ for a formally free but even more 
uncertain existence as landless seasonal 
workers. They are out from under the control 
of a white master – and for some workers that 
is indeed a significant degree of liberation. But 
for those without permanent jobs and with few 
resources, this shift may well not mean the end 
of subjection to exploitative and sometimes 
even violent patron-client relations. 
An unsettling and unsettled new landscape 
is emerging from these changes. The old 
categories – paternalism, modernisation, 
democratisation, development – seem to 
offer only a partial grip on its realities. What 
conceptual and theoretical apparatus will help 
us orient sensible policies in future?
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Poverty and social exclusion
It may be useful here to return to the notion of ‘social exclusion’ and to consider whether it helps make sense of the complex 
and desperate realities of long-term poverty in 
contexts like those discussed above. 
The answer depends in part on just what 
we mean by it and how we use it. If we see 
‘social exclusion’ simply as denoting, in the 
broadest sense, the idea that poor people are 
excluded from effective participation in social 
and economic life, there certainly seems 
a sense in which this is true of poor people 
in Ceres. Poverty in Ceres certainly is about 
going hungry. But going hungry is only one 
(crucial and brutal) aspect of the general way 
in which the state of being poor undermines 
the ability of poor people to participate 
fully in their own lives. This is a crucial and 
important point: although poverty does not 
rob people of agency, it certainly massively 
circumscribes and limits the forms of agency 
that are available to them. Any attempt to 
understand chronic poverty in Ceres should 
begin and end with this issue: the intimate and 
mutually reinforcing links between poverty 
(in the narrow sense) and the lack of power of 
poor households. The lack of the basic assets 
necessary for household food production or 
entrepreneurial activity, and the consequent 
dependence of households on insecure paid 
jobs and on networks of patronage renders 
them and their members profoundly marginal 
in the very landscape in which they play such 
a central role. 
This marginality takes many forms. Most 
obviously, asset depletion and cash poverty 
denies poor people the ability to participate 
fully in a society in which acts and practices 
of consumption are given increasing cultural 
and material centrality. But this is only one of 
the ways in which poverty and lack of power 
produce and reinforce each other. It reduces 
them to a dependent status in complex and 
unequal relationships of patronage, clientilism 
and exploitation, and robs them of many of 
the resources and capabilities that they need in 
order to be able to claim rights and entitlements 
5. Theorising chronic poverty
that are theoretically afforded them in 
democratic society. It massively narrows the 
circle of effective impact of households and 
their members on their circumstances and their 
society. Whatever resources and capabilities 
households have access to have to be used, in 
the first place, for the basic tasks of household 
reproduction and individual survival. This is a 
vicious circle: while a past history of effective 
participation builds resources and capacity for 
future effective participation (Gaventa 1998), 
the past and present political disempowerment 
of poor communities such as Bella Vista, 
Op die Berg and Nduli means they lack the 
political resources that can be a foundation for 
future engagement. And this, in turn, renders 
poor households much less able to challenge 
the other social processes whereby they are 
marginalised on the national stage.
Beyond inclusion and exclusion
This very broad interpretation of the concept 
– focusing not so much on the exclusionary 
processes that may cause deprivation as on the 
exclusionary effects of poverty itself – draws 
attention on the wide-ranging and multi-
dimensional ways in which poverty is linked 
to powerlessness, the limited nature of poor 
people’s agency in modern democratic society, 
and the ways in which these realities in turn 
perpetuate poverty. It resonates very much 
with the attention Nattrass and Seekings (2001) 
give to the concentration of poverty among the 
members of the marginal working class and the 
landless rural poor and their relative exclusion 
from the centres of political power in South 
Africa. The question is, however, how this 
insight can be used to inform policy.
Here, it seems that we uncover problems. 
For all De Haan’s emphasis on the multiple 
uses of the term and on its overlaps with other 
paradigms such as Amartya Sen’s work on 
capabilities and the work of Robert Chambers 
on vulnerability (De Haan 1998), we have to 
pay attention to what is distinctive about it as 
a concept. And this seems to inhere mostly 
in its specific focus on exclusion through 
some specific social mechanism, from some 
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specific social good or other. Important as 
these dynamics may be as contributory causes 
to poverty in some cases (and the institutions 
of apartheid are a good example) there is 
real danger in proposing social exclusion as 
a fundamental underlying cause of poverty 
and chronic poverty – at least in societies like 
South Africa and contexts like Ceres. 
This is where matters become slightly more 
complicated. Mention the word ‘exclusion’, 
and the idea of ‘inclusion’ is sure to follow. 
Part of the appeal of ‘social exclusion’ as 
a concept in policy debates is its facility in 
the construction of appealing and seductive 
policy narratives. In the EU, the identification 
of ‘social exclusion’ is almost inevitably 
linked to highly normative meta-narratives 
about the need for ‘insertion’ ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘integration’. In the UK an example is 
the New Labour discourse that links – in 
a rather moralising way – the combating of 
social exclusion to the idea of ‘getting the 
people to work’. (Percy-Smith 2000:3, 19). 
Even where the concept has not been entirely 
institutionalised and codified in the rhetoric of 
public policy and government, these narratives 
have a stronghold.
Sometimes, and in the most general 
terms, this may of course be appropriate – for 
example when a focus on ‘social exclusion’ 
leads to ‘a recognition of the need for enabling 
policies to provide the poor or excluded with 
the capabilities to participate in economic 
growth and society’ (De Haan 1998:16). But 
what should these ‘enabling policies’ look 
like? There is a danger that we may pass too 
easily over dynamics that are more complex 
than we suppose. 
Part of the problem lies in the self-confident 
assumption that we know what poor people 
need to be included in. At first glance the 
notion that it makes sense to talk, as the EU’s 
policy documents do, about people’s exclusion 
from the ‘normal’ activities of ‘modern’ 
society, may seem pretty uncontroversial. 
Viewed from an African standpoint, where 
those concepts have played an often shadowy 
role in the legitimation of imperialism and 
colonialism, they seem altogether more 
shaky. Whose ‘normal’ are we talking about 
here? And what values and practices count 
as ‘modern’? How can these ideas be used in 
multicultural contexts, where the central ideas 
that define national identity are essentially 
contested? Who is to be ‘included’ in what? 
This is not merely a theoretical point. In South 
Africa, for instance, the simplistic assumption 
that development entails broadening access 
for the marginalised poor to the infrastructures 
and systems that serve the wealthy urban elite 
has lately been recognised to be profoundly 
damaging, and significantly out of step with 
the real needs of poor households (De Satgé 
2002). It cannot be assumed that ‘integration’, 
‘incorporation’ and ‘inclusion’ are necessarily 
panaceas for chronic poverty. Exactly how they 
will affect poor people depends very largely on 
what poor households are integrated or inserted 
into, and the exact ways in which economic 
and social power relations actually work. 
Facile and sweeping policy prescriptions can 
easily miss these details. 
At the crudest level, this happens when 
social exclusion is given too important a causal 
role, or is given a crudely reductionist and 
economistic reading. Accounts of social 
exclusion can all too easily form part of an 
analysis that sees exclusion as the result 
of ‘extraneous’ social factors – racism, 
ideology, policy or politics – excluding (or de-
incentivising) particular people from beneficial 
participation in the workings of an economy 
that is seen as value-free and intrinsically 
neutral. This emphasis on discrimination, 
for example, is central in Gore’s work on 
social exclusion in sub-Saharan Africa (Gore 
1984). In a broader sense, this is the kind of 
economism Raymond Apthorpe has in his 
sights when he questions:
the binarity of the conceptualization that 
assigns ‘distribution’ only to ‘social’ 
and ‘growth’ only to ‘economic’, 
denoting ‘exclusion’ as ‘social’ only 
and then making just ‘social exclusion’ 
responsible for poverty.
(Apthorpe 1999:542). 
As problematic is the notion that social 
exclusion should be defined in terms of the 
‘failure’ of a system – for example, the legal 
system or the labour market – which, were it 
functioning ‘properly’, would be promoting 
civic or economic integration (for example, 
Shucksmith & Chapman 1998:229, citing 
Commins 1993). Such analyses depend on 
an untenable and teleological conception 
of legal or market relations as somehow 
existing outside the realm of social power, as 
if they can be conceived separately from the 
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broader social relations within which they 
are embedded. One of the key assumptions in 
this paper is that such an artificial conceptual 
division is not useful. Markets and economies 
are always thoroughly social in nature, always 
already structured by political ideologies, 
social identities and contingent and contestable 
discursive practice. To see these as ‘distorting’ 
markets and economies in some way is to be 
in danger of becoming blind to the extent to 
which the existence and functioning of these 
markets are intrinsically dependent on the 
realities of conflict, unequal power relations 
and historical legacies of violence and 
dispossession. 
It is certainly not helpful to try to portray 
off-farm poor households in Ceres as 
‘excluded’ from the labour market, or to try to 
portray that market as having ‘failed’. Such an 
analysis would be so abstract as to have almost 
nothing to do with the reality of how that 
market actually works. For the white farmers 
who own most of the land and use most of the 
labour market in Ceres, the seasonal labour 
market is most assuredly not failing. It is 
working fairly well. It succeeds in providing 
them with the cheap labour they need when 
they need it, and helps them avoid some 
of the most important consequences of the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of the harvest 
season. The poverty, hunger, powerlessness 
and marginality of poor black people in Ceres 
is not the by-product of the ‘failure’ of the 
seasonal labour market. It is a result of its 
most central and important features. More 
particularly, it results, not from the exclusion 
of people from that market, but from the ways 
they are included. 
Indeed, the crucial feature of what Samir 
Amin called the ‘Africa of the labour reserves’ 
is the close link between inequality and 
poverty on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the historical processes of dispossession that 
worked to render people dependent on a settler-
dominated labour market in the first place. 
This has prompted some critics of dominant 
development discourses to prefer ‘adverse’ 
or ‘passive’ incorporation to the notion of 
social exclusion (Bracking 2003; Murray 
2001). While the term ‘social exclusion’ is 
helpful insofar as it focuses attention on the 
general socially disabling effects of poverty 
and the consequent dynamics that in turn 
further entrench it, it provides a poor way 
of understanding the precise ways in which 
poor households are actually inserted into 
the economic power relations within which 
they are caught. It is tempting to argue, from 
this perspective, that what poor households 
dependent on insecure and poorly-paid jobs 
may require is not more incorporation, but less – 
or at least they require strategies and resources 
that may help them become less dependent on 
these labour markets in the first place.
Part of the problem here is the very 
simplicity and appeal of the language of 
‘social exclusion’, and the assumption that 
it is possible to counterpose ‘inclusion’ and 
‘exclusion’ in a simple or clear way. Language 
is important here. In this paper, the situation 
of poor households in Ceres above has 
deliberately been couched, not in terms of the 
language of exclusion, but of marginality. This 
is something entirely different, for what defines 
marginality is not exclusion, or even imperfect 
inclusion, but the terms and conditions of 
incorporation. 
Describing and summarising these is no 
small task, partly because, as Gillian Hart 
argues, any account of these changes inevitably 
needs to deal with ‘how local worlds... [have] 
been made in quite different ways out of 
superficially similar conditions’ (Hart 2002). 
Adverse incorporation in Ceres does not work 
in the same way as it does in Cape Town’s 
African townships, Mt Frere or Lesotho. 
There is nothing inevitable or a priori about 
the way in which these processes work. They 
follow no predetermined path; rather, they are 
themselves historical and social. Outcomes 
and paths depend very much on the course of 
the processes of specific and local processes of 
negotiation and contestation.
At the same time, it is possible to point 
out some of the key themes and dynamics 
that shape chronic poverty in Ceres and South 
Africa. 
1. The first and most obvious key reality 
underlying chronic poverty in Southern 
Africa is what Julian May has called ‘asset 
stripping’ (May 2000) – the legacy of 
dispossession left by colonial conquest, 
white settlement and slavery. As a result of 
this process, poor households lack direct 
and independent access to the natural, 
physical and economic resources needed 
for basic household food production or 
independent entrepreneurial activity. It is 
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important to note that this dispossession 
is, under current economic and political 
conditions and for the purposes of 
policymakers, for the most part all but 
irreversible. For better or for worse, 
the measures required to effect a large-
scale and fundamental re-balancing of 
asset distribution in the short term are 
unavailable, and certainly unthinkable 
within the narrow terms of what 
development agencies and international 
financial institutions are prepared to 
imagine. For better or for worse, whatever 
measures are available to South African 
pro-poor policymakers have to be conceived 
on a terrain defined by accepting as a fait 
accompli the massive historical inequities 
of a world shaped by slavery and colonial 
settlement. To a large extent, then, ‘adverse 
incorporation’ is here to stay.
2. This is intimately related to the process of 
monetisation – the increasing centrality 
of money as a source of entitlement and 
as a basis for access to social goods. One 
important driver of monetisation is the 
lack of independent access of households 
to the forms of ‘capital’ denoted by three 
of the five sectors of the DFID sustainable 
livelihoods ‘asset pentagon’. This renders 
them dependent on economic markets 
for basic needs such as food security. 
But monetisation is also driven by other 
processes. Privatisation and cost recovery 
policies enforced by the adoption of 
International Monetary Fund orthodoxies 
in South Africa have meant that more 
and more social goods are now subject 
to monetisation. The shift away from 
paternalism into the broader rural off-farm 
underclass is clearly a shift that involves 
a greater degree of monetisation. Access 
to services and social goods is no longer 
dependent on the precarious goodwill of a 
white farmer. It is (theoretically) a right and 
(practically) has to be paid for. This shift 
away from personal power relationships 
to the liberating anonymity and universal 
validity of money is of course empowering 
for those that have access to money – but 
it implies very real costs to those whose 
cash income depends on an uncertain and 
fluctuating seasonal labour market. Like 
colonial dispossession, monetisation is 
a deeply entrenched trend, and will not 
be easy to reverse or even halt. Attractive 
as proposals from organisations such 
as the South African New Economics 
Forum (SANE) for the development 
of ‘community currencies’ are, there is 
probably very little scope for shifting the 
massive centrality and urgency of poor 
households’ desire and demand for cash. At 
the same time, the impact of monetisation 
on some key households needs such as 
food security, energy, transport and other 
local government services can probably be 
minimised.
3. In this context, this means that the social 
relations that link poor people into 
broader political and societal processes 
are dominated by relations of patronage 
and clientelism. A key aspect of these 
relationships is their fundamentally 
ambiguous and double-edged nature. On 
the one hand, these relationships are never 
only and nakedly about exploitation. They 
often involve a degree of protection or 
benefit for those who are caught within 
them, and they also involve a significant 
degree of ‘consent’, or at least a link with 
an underlying hegemonic ideology or 
discursive framework which is shared by 
both the more and the less powerful. On the 
other hand, they also involve significantly 
unequal power relations, a huge potential 
for exploitation and manipulation, and 
ultimately work to undermine the social 
agency of the less powerful. Above all, 
they involve power relationships, processes 
of negotiation and accommodation in 
which both acquiescence and resistance, 
both acceptance and rejection, both 
brutal exploitation and accommodative 
negotiation, can play a role. Finally, 
because of all these features, they are 
not easily swept aside, and attempts at 
‘modernisation’ very easily lead simply 
to their re-invention or mutation under 
conditions of modernity.
4. The implications and dynamics of 
monetisation are importantly shaped by 
remoteness and distance. This is a central 
issue for those who are concerned with 
understanding small-town and rural poverty 
in South Africa. A simple initial theoretical 
observation: remoteness and distance are of 
course not simple geographic facts. They 
are invested with social significance and 
Forgotten by the highway: Globalisation, adverse incorporation 
and chronic poverty in a commercial farming district
28
consequence by the way in which networks, 
institutions and systems link people to 
places. For households with relatively 
good access to physical and natural capital, 
the distance to Ceres and Cape Town is 
irrelevant; for those whose livelihoods and 
needs link them to those places, remoteness 
is crucial. How it affects them depends 
on the situation. Remoteness confers 
advantages and disadvantages depending on 
how households and individuals are inserted 
in these broader networks. For those with 
access to transport, it creates livelihood 
opportunities such as transport and retail. 
For those without, it imposes costs. Above 
all, it links Ceres to its even more remote 
hinterlands: the Ceres Karoo and the 
Eastern Cape from which a steady trickle 
of desperately poor people arrive in the 
farmlands, willing to work for even lower 
wages.
5. Closely linked to the social workings 
of distance, remoteness and contiguity 
is the development of technologies of 
management and power. Here, social 
researchers can probably benefit hugely 
from the theorists drawing from Foucault 
and, more recently, actor-network theory. 
These theorists have explored the ways 
in which the workings of agency and 
social power are intricately interdependent 
with the development of complex ‘social 
technologies’ which allow for the creation 
of new forms of agency and new contexts 
of negotiation and contestation. They 
have in particular called for a close look 
at the often invisible underlying enabling 
conditions and practices that lead to the 
empowerment of some people and the 
relative disempowerment of others. This 
provides an important perspective for 
analysing the kinds of social agency that 
is available, for example, to Department 
of Social Development officials, labour 
inspectors, social workers, NGO staff and 
fair trade activists, just to mention a few. 
In all these cases, much can be learned by 
looking at the integration and insertion of 
particular individuals or groups into much 
broader institutional and socio-technical 
apparatuses and management systems. 
Careful attention should be paid to how this 
makes certain kinds of action possible while 
ruling out others, empowering some while 
marginalising or failing to empower others. 
6. A particularly important sub-category of 
the above is constituted by the discourses 
and practices of government. This involves 
looking at much more than policy and 
implementation. Rather, attention also 
needs to be given to the underlying 
assumptions and strategies within which 
policy and implementation is shaped – the 
‘optic’, to use Scott’s term (1998) – within 
which poverty as a problem members of 
poor households are conceptualised and 
approached. In the South African context, 
this works in a paradoxical and complex 
way, functioning both as a potential 
condition for agency and a limit upon its 
scope. On the one hand, for instance, the 
transition from democracy has involved a 
substantial reconceptualisation of ‘subjects’ 
as ‘citizens’ and an insistence (for example, 
in the Constitution) on enshrining all 
manner of social goods as basic rights. 
On the other hand, much of the social 
space for agency that might be possible in 
a democratic ‘citizen politics’ is somewhat 
inhibited by the hegemonic conception of 
most poor people as passive ‘beneficiaries’ 
and ‘recipients’ of ‘delivery’. A similar 
contradiction is found in the discourse 
around ‘participation’ in development 
and governance. While the insistence that 
poor people are to be seen as partners 
in development seems to create a huge 
potential space for ‘action from below’ and 
a radical citizen’s democracy, the technical 
and institutional design of development 
projects often reduces ‘participation’ to 
a depoliticised process, while key decisions 
are arrived at by ‘experts’ and ‘consultants’. 
Both these processes are linked to the 
tendency to see development essentially as a 
technical and apolitical process. 
This is an incomplete and fairly sketchy 
account of some of the key factors that shape 
livelihoods and agency for those who are 
incorporated into southern African modernity 
on unfavourable terms. 
All these processes and institutions work 
to integrate poor people into the circuits and 
networks of ‘developed’ society in ways that 
marginalise them, undermining their ability 
to control and impact upon the systems into 
which they are locked. And all of them are 
to some extent irreversibly and inextricably 
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part of the social context in which policy 
has to be made. None of them can be easily 
discounted or swept aside. Above all, what 
they should illustrate fairly clearly is why 
it is necessary to move beyond any simple 
opposition between ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. 
Neither a greater degree of inclusion in the 
South African job market nor dreams of 
subsistence-based independence from this 
inclusion capture the irreversibility of the 
incorporation of poor households into the 
broader monetised economy, the complexity of 
the power relations and institutions that support 
and undermine their strategies for survival 
and prosperity, or the dynamic nature of the 
processes of contestation and negotiation that 
shape the outcomes of particular interventions. 
Rather, fine-grained analyses and policy 
solutions have to be developed that are suited 
to the realities of life in this intermediate 
terrain – policies that engage with, challenge 
and enlarge the space for poor people’s agency.
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An analysis of the livelihoods of the off-farm poor in Ceres has highlighted several key issues and redressed some 
important imbalances. In the first place, it has 
shown up the importance of going beyond 
narrow money-metric approaches and rather 
considering the multi-dimensional nature of 
poverty. In this context, the usefulness of the 
concept of ‘social exclusion’ rather depends 
on the sense in which it is used. If we follow 
the lead of De Haan (1998) and see social 
exclusion as an aspect of multidimensional 
poverty, it focuses attention on the 
disempowering implications of poverty: how 
lack of access to natural and economic capital 
and the scarcity of paid employment work to 
undermine poor people’s ability to participate 
fully in society and limits their capabilities to 
secure entitlements. Care, however, needs to 
be taken when identifying policy initiatives 
6. Conclusions
to address social exclusion. This is so 
particularly when economic exclusion of one 
kind or another is seen in some facile way as 
a direct cause of poverty, and when our policy 
narratives start counterposing ‘exclusion’ and 
‘inclusion’ in simple ways. Social exclusion, 
as De Haan reminds us, is always part of 
a dynamic or a process. Considered closely, 
those processes are as often about adverse or 
disadvantageous incorporation and insertion as 
they are about exclusion in any simple sense. 
This requires that we understand, not only of 
household-level livelihood components, but the 
local, regional and global institutions, power 
relationships and processes that perpetuate 
and create that marginality. Tackling chronic 
poverty requires tackling those power relations. 
Rather than narratives of ‘inclusion’ and 
integration, it may be that what is needed are 
narratives of empowerment and differentiation.
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1 ‘Ceres is hard, and I mean hard, but I think 
we will survive.’
2  Roughly translated, ‘my eyesight is not 
what it was’. The word gesientes cannot be 
translated into English.
3  ‘The child’s father’s mother.’
4  ‘Previously disadvantaged community’, 
literally ‘the left-behind community’. 
5 ‘Black’ here is used in the widest sense, 
to include all identities (coloured, African, 
Indian and others) excluded as ‘non-white’ 
by apartheid policy and discourse.







12 The single-channel citrus marketing board.
13 ‘Coloured’ is used here to denote those 
people classified as such under apartheid. 
It does not refer, as is commonly assumed, 
to ‘mixed race’ people. We are all mixed 
Endnotes
race in South Africa, and many coloured 
people can claim a fairly unsullied African 
(that is, Khoisan) ancestry. Colouredness is 
a racialised cultural identity and generally 
refers to those black people descended from 
slaves and indentured servants at the Cape 
who were cut off, through the slave trade or 
genocide, from their own culture and who 
fashioned new, creolised identities through 
appropriating, translating and subverting 
elements of settler culture (Erasmus 2002).
14 Interview with ‘Jacobus Linnie’, Bella 
Vista, April 2000.
15 Literally ‘smugglers’. 
16 Interview with ‘Freddie Arends’, 15 
January 2003.
17 Interview with Nik Wulschlegger and 




21 Literally ‘smuggling houses’ – illegal liquor 
outlets.
22 ‘Yard boys’.
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